Intergrating the Right of Association with the Bellotti Right to Hear Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life Inc. by Eberhardt, Charles N.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 72
Issue 1 November 1986 Article 6
Intergrating the Right of Association with the
Bellotti Right to Hear Federal Election
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life Inc.
Charles N. Eberhardt
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles N. Eberhardt, Intergrating the Right of Association with the Bellotti Right to Hear Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life Inc. , 72 Cornell L. Rev. 159 (1986)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol72/iss1/6
NOTES
INTEGRATING THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION WITH
THE BELLOTTI RIGHT TO HEAR-FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION v. MASSACHUSETTS
CITIZENS FOR LIFE, INC. *
This Term, the United States Supreme Court will review a deci-
sion by the First Circuit Court of Appeals holding that the federal
corporate campaign financing statute violates the first amendment.
The statute, codified at section 441b of title two,' prohibits all cor-
porate contributions and expenditures in connection with federal
elections.2 The First Circuit in Federal Election Commission v. Massa-
chusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL)3 held section 441b unconstitu-
tional as applied to prohibit a nonprofit, ideological corporation's
publication of a newsletter advocating the election of specific pro-
life candidates to federal office.
This Note argues that the First Circuit properly decided the
case, but that the statute withstands first amendment scrutiny when
applied to commercial corporations. These divergent results reflect
the different first amendment interests protecting political expres-
sion by nonprofit, ideological corporations and by commercial cor-
porations. Expenditures by Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.
(MCFL) reflect the political interests of its contributors, who sup-
port the corporation's ideological advocacy purpose. Consequently,
the right of association protects the corporation's expression. Di-
rect restraints on this core first amendment right require strict judi-
cial scrutiny. For first amendment purposes, an ideological
* As this issue went to press, the Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit. FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 55 U.S.L.W. 4067 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1986).
1 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982).
2 Section 44lb(a) provides:
It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by
authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure
in connection with any election to any political office, or in connection
with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select
candidates for any political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any
labor organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection
with any election at which presidential and vice presidential electors or a
Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner
to, Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary elec-
tion or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of
the foregoing offices ....
Id. § 441b(a).
3 769 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1985), prob. juris noted, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986).
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organization's corporate status is virtually irrelevant. A commercial
corporation, on the other hand, derives protection for its political
expression from a different first amendment interest-the electo-
rate's right to hear diverse political views. This right to hear pro-
vides less comprehensive protection than the right of association.
This Note also balances the governmental interest in regulating
corporate political expression through section 44 lb, first against the
right of association protecting a nonprofit, ideological corporation's
expression, and then against the right to hear protecting a commer-
cial corporation's expression. Such a balancing of interests demon-
strates that section 441b unconstitutionally burdens protected
expression of ideological corporations like MCFL, but withstands




A. Types of First Amendment Protection
The Supreme Court has yet to develop a coherent theory4 of
the first amendment's prohibition5 of restraints on freedom of ex-
pression. 6 Rather, the Court has drawn on various functional first
amendment theories7 to explain its decisions within discrete areas of
the law. These theories include the views that the first amendment
protects individual expression in the interest of self-realization;8
4 See M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 9 (1984) ("[T]he
Supreme Court has failed in its attempts to devise a coherent theory of free expres-
sion."); Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1212, 1252 (1983) ("[The Court has been unwill-
ing to confine the first amendment to a single value or even to a few values."); Wright,
Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 609, 633 n.144 (1982) ("The Court has never developed a comprehen-
sive theory of the meaning of the first amendment; it has used a hodge-podge of differ-
ent doctrines at various times and in various contexts.").
5 "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 This Note does not address the first amendment's separate protections of press
and assembly. Consequently, the term "freedom of expression" as used in this Note
refers only to speech and nonverbal advocacy by speakers other than the institutional
press.
7 All of the major first amendment theories are more or less "functional" because
"the inquiry [into the content of the first amendment] is not a matter of classification but
of reasoning. It does not turn on the abstract properties of something called 'speech'
but on the rationale for protecting the 'freedom of speech' against majoritarian regula-
tion." Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment,
65 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1979); see also J. BARRON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH
AND FREE PRESS 8-9 (1979) ("[T]he functions and purposes of the First Amendment
dominate ... the doctrinal law of free speech and free press.").
8 See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4-7
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that it protects all expression in the interest of a free marketplace of
ideas, where truth ultimately prevails through competition; 9 and
that it safeguards democratic self-government by protecting polit-
ical dissent and fostering electoral accountability.10 By applying
these theories in specific cases, the Court has recognized that free-
dom of expression encompasses three distinct rights: the right to
speak, the right of association, and the right to hear.
1. The Right to Speak
The first amendment unquestionably protects an individual's
right of advocacy.' 1 The Court sometimes grounds this right in a
(1966) (affirmation of self); M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.03 (1984)
(self-fulfillment function); M. REDISH, supra note 4, at 11 ("[Tlhe constitutional guaran-
tee of free speech ultimately serves only one true value, . . . 'individual self-realiza-
tion.' "); Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646 (1982) (self-realization function of first
amendment precludes first amendment protection for either commercial or corporate
political speech). For opinions recognizing the self-realization function of the first
amendment, see Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534
n.2 (1980); First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978); id. at 804-06
(White,J., dissenting); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427-28 (1974) (Marshall,J.,
concurring); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
9 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("Mhe best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the compe-
tition of the market .... That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution."); Z. CHAFEE,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATEs 31, 137-38 (1941); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSITU-
TIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 576-77 (1978) ("marketplace of ideas" is one of three major first
amendment theories). For the Court's recognition of this theory, see Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) ("The relationship of [commercial] speech to the mar-
ketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of
ideas."); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the pur-
pose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas .... ").
10 "Mhe political speech rationale does not protect a right of individual expression
for its own sake but rather seeks to preserve the systemic integrity of our constitutional
scheme of self-government." Jackson &Jeffiies, supra note 7, at 11. See A. MEIILEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24-27 (1948).
Justice Harlan applied this rationale in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971):
The constitutional right of free expression ... is designed and intended
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately
produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the be-
lief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual
dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.
See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (protection of "free discussion of
governmental affairs" was a major purpose of first amendment); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964) (democratic self-government requires protection
of free expression); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection
given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.").
11 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1971) (first amendment pro-
tects individual's right to express opposition to draft); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
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self-realization theory,1 2 but usually explains it as a prerequisite of
democratic government. 13 In any event, it is a right of natural per-
sons only14 and encompasses the right to persuade as well as to in-
form. 15 Restrictions on the right to speak, particularly those
burdening political expression, require exacting scrutiny; 16 courts
will sustain such restrictions only if narrowly drawn and supported
by a compelling government interest.
17
2. The Right of Association
The Supreme Court has extended the individual's right of polit-
ical expression to ideological organizations by recognizing a deriva-
tive right of association.' 8 The Court first acknowledged this right
537 (1945) (first amendment protects "the opportunity to persuade to action, not
merely to describe facts").
12 See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(compulsory flag salute regulation "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is
the purpose of the First Amendment" to protect); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95
(1940) (first amendment rights to be protected in part so "that men may speak as they
think on matters vital to them"); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(Brandeis,J., concurring) ("[T]he final end of the State [and of the first amendment] was
to make men free to develop their faculties .... "); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804-06 (WhiteJ.,
dissenting) (self-realization function not furthered by commercial corporate speech).
The Court has also recognized that the individual's interest in self-expression may sup-
port a right not to speak or to associate with the speech of others. See Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903, 920-21 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(discussing cases recognizing "negative free speech rights").
13 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (protecting individual ex-
pression in interest of self-government).
14 The Supreme Court has never recognized a corporation's right to speak. Bellotti
provides the strongest support for the proposition that the Court does not recognize a
corporate right to speak. The Bellotti Court criticized the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court for too narrowly framing the issue in the case as "whether and to what extent
corporations have First Amendment rights." 435 U.S. at 775-76. The Court proceeded
to find the challenged statute an unconstitutional abridgement of listeners' right to hear
as opposed to corporations' right to speak. Id. at 776; see infra note 92 and accompany-
ing text. Had the Bellotti Court recognized a corporate right to speak, it would have
avoided such a novel and controversial approach. Chief Justice Burger, in a separate
concurrence, accorded corporations the same first amendment rights as individuals. Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. at 802 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
One commentator has interpreted Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 514 (opinion of
RobertsJ.), 527 (opinion of StoneJ.) (1939) as ruling that corporations are not entitled
to free speech. Note, The Corporation and the Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corporate
Speech, 90 YALE LJ. 1833, 1836 n.17 (1981) (Bellotti Court seemed to overlook Hague,
where "a majority of Justices, on differing grounds, held that corporate persons were
not entitled to freedom of speech"); see also Hallmark Prods., Inc. v. Mosley, 190 F.2d
904, 909 (8th Cir. 1951) (citing Hague, court noted that "the right of free speech.., is a
right guaranteed to natural persons only").
15 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 429 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
16 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45.
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (first amendment
"has been construed to include certain" rights of association). The right of association
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in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 19 decided in 1958. In Patterson,
the Court held that an Alabama court's contempt order against the
NAACP for refusing to disclose its membership lists abridged the
NAACP members' right "to engage in lawful association in support
of their common beliefs." 20 The Court found that the freedoms of
speech and assembly implicitly encompassed the right of association
because "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by
group association." 21 Four years later, in NAACP v. Button,22 the
Court extended Patterson by recognizing a first amendment right in
association itself. The Court found unconstitutional Virginia's pros-
ecution of the NAACP for soliciting plaintiffs to litigate the constitu-
tionality of that state's public school segregation laws. 23 The Court
noted that "[i]n the context of NAACP objectives [securing equality
for blacks], litigation is . . .a form of political expression" 24 pro-
tected by the right of association.
25
Because the right of association derives from individuals' free-
dom of expression, it attaches only to expression that truly reflects
the association members' interests. 26 Expression that reflects an
ideological organization's explicit goals and purposes receives right
encompasses both the individual's right to associate and expression by the association
reflecting its members' interests. See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
19 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,
74 YALE LJ. 1, 1 (1964) (Court's recognition of new right of association in Patterson is
"striking development").
20 357 U.S. at 460. The Alabama Attorney General brought an action to enjoin the
NAACP, a New York corporation, from operating within the state for failure to comply
with Alabama's foreign corporation registration statute. Id. at 451-52. The trial court
found the NAACP in contempt for failure to turn its membership lists over to the state.
The state claimed it needed the lists to prepare for a preliminary hearing. Id. at 452-54.
21 Id. at 460. The right belonged to the association's members, but the Court
granted the NAACP standing to assert it on their behalf because denying such standing
would have forced the members to assert the right themselves, thereby revealing the
very affiliation they sought to shield. Id. at 459.
22 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
23 Id. at 437. The NAACP had offered the support of its staff attorneys to blacks
willing to challenge Virginia's school segregation laws in the courts. Id.
24 Id. at 429.
25 Id. at 428-29.
26 "Association is an extension of individual freedom. It is a method of making
more effective, of giving greater depth and scope to, the individual's needs, aspirations
and liberties." Emerson, supra note 19, at 4; see FEC v. National Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,494 (1985) (NCPAC) (protection available to organizations
that serve to amplify expression of large numbers of individuals); Citizens Against Rent
Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981) (right
of association protects "the practice of persons sharing common views banding to-
gether' "); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978) ("purpose or motive of the
speaker" is important consideration when evaluating right of association protection);
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15 (right of association protects "'the common advancement of
political beliefs and ideas'" (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56 (1973))).
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of association protection because the members and supporters of
such an organization presumably contribute funds to further such
expression. 27 Within its sphere, the right of association affords an
ideological organization's expression the same protection that the
right to speak affords an individual's expression. 28 Moreover, if
unity of ideological purpose suggests that the right of association
should attach to an organization's political expression, a corporate
form of organization should not prevent such attachment. 29 Political
expression by a purely commercial corporation, on the other hand,
does not implicate the right of association because no unity of ideo-
27 See, e.g., NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 495 (PAC expenditures derive first amendment pro-
tection from contributors who contribute in order to further PAC political positions);
MCFL, 769 F.2d at 23 ("Individuals who contribute to MCFL do so because they sup-
port MCFL's anti-abortion position and presumably would favor expenditures for a pub-
lication that informs contributors and others of the position of various candidates on the
abortion issue.").
28 See NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496 (statute restricting PAC expenditures protected by
right of association must be narrowly tailored in advancing compelling governmental
interest); In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 432 (requiring compelling governmental interest and
narrowly drawn means where right of association is implicated); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25
("[Tihe right of association... 'like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.'
In view of the fundamental nature of the right to associate, governmental 'action which
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scru-
tiny.'" (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960) (citations omitted)) (quot-
ing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958))).
Professor Emerson considers this identical protection necessary:
[A]ssociational expression should be entitled to the same complete pro-
tection as individual expression. Associational expression is of the same
nature as individual expression. Organization primarily supplies the
mechanism for reaching a wider audience; it does not change the charac-
ter of expression as the communication of beliefs, opinions, information
and ideas, or its content.
Emerson, supra note 19, at 22.
29 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784 (expression otherwise protected by first amendment
does not lose protection because its source is corporation). Justice White made the
point explicitly:
where are some corporations formed for the express purpose of ad-
vancing certain ideological causes shared by all their members . ...
Under such circumstances, association in a corporate form may be viewed
as merely a means of achieving effective self-expression. But this is
hardly the case generally with corporations operated for the purpose of
making profits.
Id. at 805 (White, J., dissenting). The Button Court noted the NAACP's corporate status
but deemed it insignificant in allowing the NAACP to assert its own first amendment
rights. 371 U.S. at 428. In NCPAC, both defendants were incorporated as well. Never-
theless, their ideological function controlled their first amendment treatment:
We . . . reject the notion that the PACs' form of organization or
method of solicitation diminishes their entitlement to First Amendment
protection. The First Amendment freedom of association is squarely im-
plicated in this case. NCPAC and FCM are mechanisms by which large
numbers of individuals of modest means can join together in organiza-
tions which serve to "amplify[] the voice of their adherents."
470 U.S. at 494 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22).
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logical purpose exists.30
3. The Right to Hear
Listeners, as well as speakers, have a first amendment interest
in free expression.31 The Court has drawn primarily on the "mar-
ketplace of ideas" theory of the first amendment to support a gen-
eral right to hear.32 As with the right of association, the right to
hear protects expression in the interests of natural individuals. Un-
like the right of association, however, the right to hear derives not
from the interests of proponents of the expression but rather from
the interests of its recipients. 33 The right to hear attaches to any
public expression, regardless of its purpose, source, or protection
by a correlative right of speech or association. 34 Accordingly, the
right to hear protects the expression of corporations as well as that
of natural persons.
35
30 A commercial corporation's political expression typically reflects the views of top
management, rather than of the shareholders. See Nicholson, The Constitutionality of the
Federal Restrictions on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 65 COR-
NELL L. REv. 945, 960-61 (1980); O'Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revis-
ited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67
GEO. L.J. 1347, 1363 (1979). According to another view, "[T]he market mechanism...
dictates the content of the [commercial] enterprise's speech, and thus separates the deci-
sion concerning speech content from the value decisions of either the employees or the
owners of the enterprise." Baker, supra note 8, at 653. A commercial corporation's
shareholders may invest in it for a wide range of reasons, but economic enrichment
likely outweighs political expression. Ideological unity among shareholders is even less
likely. The "corporation sole" presents a narrow exception. See infra note 205 and ac-
companying text. But see The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1, 165 (1978)
(arguing that "corporate political expression should be protected as the speech and as-
sociational activity of the individual owners").
31 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the infor-
mational function of advertising."); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) ("presupposing" willing speaker,
consumers of prescription drugs can assert right to receive advertising). Within the
unique field of broadcast media, as a result of the "frequency scarcity" phenomenon, the
Court has found the rights of viewers and listeners superior to the speech rights of the
broadcasters. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (sustaining
FCC regulation requiring provision of equal time for reply to editorials); see also Bellotti,
435 U.S. at 777-83 (with respect to issues in a referendum campaign, relying on com-
mercial speech and press precedents to find corporate political expression protected in
interests of public right to hear); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (uphold-
ing individual's right to possess obscene materials on ground that "right to receive in-
formation and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to our free society"
(citation omitted)).
32 See cases cited supra notes 9 & 31.
33 See Baldwin & Karpay, Corporate Political Free Speech: 2 U.S.C. § 441b and the Superior
Rights of Natural Persons, 14 PAC. L.J. 209, 217-18 (1983).
34 See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 12-19, at 674-76 ("right to know" may simply be
"mirror" of right to speak, or it may provide sole protection of expression); infra notes
39-40 and accompanying text.
35 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 ("The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
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The source of the right to hear protection, however, suggests
its limitation. The right to hear protects expression in order to pro-
vide unidentified listeners with full information and a diversity of
views.36 As a consequence, this objective may occasionally demand
restrictions on expression. 37 For example, the right to hear does
not protect speech that itself frustrates the public's right to full in-
formation and access to a diversity of views. 38
The Court has yet to define the scope and degree of protection
that the right to hear affords. The Court frequently describes the
right to hear as a corollary to the other first amendment protec-
tions39 and has only recently given the right independent promi-
nence.40 The right to hear has provided only limited first
amendment protection in the commercial speech area, where it sur-
faces most frequently.4' For example, the first amendment "over-
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual.").
36 See id. at 783 ("[The Court's decisions involving corporations in the business of
communication or entertainment are based not only on... fostering individual self-
expression but also on ... affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas.").
37 See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 12-19, at 676 (right to know "carries the implication
that government, while it may not close the market[place of ideas], may move to correct
its defects and regulate its incidental consequences").
38 The "frequency scarcity" justification for FCC regulation of broadcast media
provides an example. The Court has upheld "equal time" regulation, admittedly a re-
striction on broadcasters' choice, in the interests of ensuring listeners and viewers access
to a diversity of views. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
Similarly, the protection the right to hear provides commercial speech is "subordinate
to the listener's informational interests." Baldwin & Karpay, supra note 33, at 218.
39 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (right to hear and
right of association as "peripheral" to specific first amendment guarantees); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (labor organizer's address at mass meeting of workers
protected by organizer's right to speak and by workers' right to hear what he has to say);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) ("The right of freedom of speech
and press ... embraces the right to distribute literature and necessarily protects the
right to receive it." (citation omitted)).
40 Several commentators suggest that Bellotti represents the Court's first unequivo-
cal statement that the first amendment protects speech in the interests of listeners, even
absent speaker interests. See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 57 (Supp. 1979); Kiley, PACing the
Burger Court: The Corporate Right to Speak and the Public Right to Hear After First National
Bank v. Bellotti, 22 ARIZ. L. REv. 427, 429 (1980).
For a thorough exposition of the Court's early treatment of the right to hear, see
Comment, Freedom to Hear: A PoliticalJustification of the First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REV.
311, 332-41 (1971).
41 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2945 n.5
(1985) (plurality opinion) (commercial speech only accorded qualified first amendment
protection); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("[Wle... have
afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection. . . while allowing modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression."); J.
BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 7, § 4.5, at 172 ("Commercial speech is still [after Vir-
ginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)] subject to state regulation more extensive than that
tolerated for ideological speech.").
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breadth" doctrine does not necessarily apply in commercial speech
cases. 42 Further, the Supreme Court more readily tolerates prophy-
lactic regulation and prior restraint of commercial speech than of
traditional political speech.43 In short, although the Court recog-
nizes the right to hear, this right affords only reduced protection,
and its precise limits remain uncertain.
B. Federal Campaign Finance Law
Campaign finance regulation has generated an extensive body
of first amendment case law. The Supreme Court has established
general principles respecting contribution and expenditure restric-
tions44 and has addressed corporate campaign spending.45 The
Court has not, however, confronted the constitutionality of statutes,
such as the one challenged in MCFL, that restrict corporate expend-
itures in candidate elections.
46
Two distinct strands of federal election reform legislation con-
verge in the MCFL problem. The first strand originated in the wake
of the Watergate scandal. The Watergate investigations highlighted
the influence that large contributors to political campaigns wielded
over elected officials. 47 With the 1974 amendments48 to the Federal
42 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977).
43 See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-68 (finding attorney's public reprimand and suspen-
sion for violation of admittedly "prophylactic" professional solicitation rule did not vio-
late his first amendment rights, despite no evidence of actual harm); Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571 n.13 (1980) ("traditional
prior restraint doctrine may not apply" to commercial speech).
44 See infra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 86-108 and accompanying text.
46 Although § 441b(a) and earlier statutes limiting corporate expenditures in candi-
date elections have faced first amendment challenges before the Supreme Court, the
Court has not reached the constitutional issue. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 68-70
(1975) (Court need not address constitutionality of statute forbidding corporate ex-
penditures in connection with federal election in shareholder's derivative suit where
statute held not to create shareholder right of action); Pipefitters Local Union 562 v.
United States, 407 U.S. 385, 399-400 (1972) (consideration of constitutional challenge
to statute premature where case remanded because of erroneous jury instructions);
United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 589-93 (1957) (unnecessary to decide on statute's
constitutionality where district court incorrectly dismissed indictment); United States v.
CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 124 (1948) (unnecessary to consider constitutional challenge where
indictment failed to state offense under the statute); Athens Lumber Co. v. FEC, 718
F.2d 363 (1Ith Cir. 1983) (en banc) (per curiam) (§ 441b(a) valid as applied to prohibit
independent expenditures by commercial corporation in support of election of candi-
date to federal office), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1092 (1984); United States v.
Chestnut, 533 F.2d 40, 50 (2d Cir.) (statute neither overbroad nor void for vagueness),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976); see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26 (explicitly reserving
issue of constitutionality of restrictions, including § 441(b), on corporate expenditures
in candidate elections).
47 L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 13-27, at 800 (1974 FECA amendments were response
to improprieties of 1972 presidential campaign); Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets,
77 COLUM. L. REv. 345, 345 (1977) (same); Wright, supra note 4, at 610 ("the Watergate
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Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA),49 Congress attempted to
counter the perceived corrupting influence of private money in poli-
tics by dramatically changing federal election financing.50 One pro-
vision limited the amount of money that an individual, group, or
political committee could contribute to, or independently expend in
support of, a federal candidate's campaign.
5 1
The second strand of legislation relates specifically to corporate
political disbursements. Congress added section 441b,52 the statute
scandals gave impetus to popular demand for strong measures to purify the political
process," which gave rise to 1974 amendments).
48 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) and in
scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, and 47 U.S.C.).
49 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-
455 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) and in scattered sections of 18 and 47 U.S.C.).
50 The Committee on House Administration noted:
The unchecked rise in campaign expenditures, coupled with the ab-
sence of limitations on contributions and expenditures, has increased the
dependence of candidates on special interest groups and large contribu-
tors. Under the present law the impression persists that a candidate can
buy an election by simply spending large sums in a campaign.
H.R. REP. No. 1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT], reprinted
in FEC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN Acr AMENDMENTS OF
1974, at 635, 637 (1977); see S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974) [hereinafter
SENATE REPORT] ("This recommended legislation is a comprehensive and far-reaching
measure... for the purpose of providing complete control over and disclosure of cam-
paign contributions and expenditures in campaigns for Federal elective office ... 
reprinted in FEC, supra, at 97, 97.
51 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
§ 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263, 1263-66 (repealed 1976). Section 101(a) prohibited individuals
from contributing more than $25,000 in a single year or more than $1,000 to any single
candidate and from spending more than $1,000 a year "relative to a clearly identified
candidate." Id., 88 Stat. at 1265. Section 101(a) also restricted the amount a multi-
candidate political committee could contribute per candidate per election. Id., 88 Stat.
at 1263.
The difference between "contributions" and independent "expenditures" has
played an important role in the constitutional challenge of FECA. See infra notes 71-83
and accompanying text. The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration discussed
the distinction:
"Independent expenditures" refer to sums expended on behalf of a can-
didate without his authorization, as distinct from contributions of money,
goods or services put at the disposal of his campaign organization.
For example, a person might purchase billboard advertisements en-
dorsing a candidate. If he does so completely on his own, and not at the
request or suggestion of the candidate or his agent's[,] that would consti-
tute an "independent expenditure on behalf of a candidate" .....
However, if the advertisement was placed in cooperation with the
candidate's campaign organization, then the amount would constitute a
gift by the supporter and an expenditure by the candidate-just as if
there had been a direct contribution enabling the candidate to place the
advertisement, himself. It would be so reported by both.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 50, at 18, reprinted in FEC, supra note 50, at 114.
52 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982).
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challenged in MCFL, to FECA in 1976, 53 but the section has deep-
rooted origins. Congress first enacted a prohibition on any corpo-
rate "money contribution in connection with any [federal] election"
in 1907.54 The law grew out of "popular feeling that aggregated
capital unduly influenced politics, an influence not stopping short of
corruption," 55 and that "corporate officials had no moral right to
use corporate funds for contribution to political parties without the
consent of the stockholders." 56 The statute was not, however,
aimed solely at preventing abuse. Rather, "[ilts underlying philoso-
phy was to sustain the active, alert responsibility of the individual
citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government. '57 Con-
gress repeatedly amended the law, extending its coverage to non-
monetary contributions, 58 to labor unions,59 and to "expenditures"
as well as to contributions. 60 Throughout this history, the legisla-
tive purposes remained remarkably consistent:61 to prevent corrup-
tion of the political process by corporate wealth, to prevent erosion
of public faith by the perception of inordinate corporate influence,
to protect the interests of shareholders who might disagree with the
political agenda of corporate managers, and to sustain voter confi-
53 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 321,
90 Stat. 475, 490-92 (amending and recodifying former 18 U.S.C. § 610) (current ver-
sion at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982)).
54 Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b (1982)).
55 United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957).
56 United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948) (citing Contributions to Political
Committees in Presidential and Other Campaigns: Hearings on Various Bills Before the House
Comm. on Election of President, Vice-President, and Representatives in Congress, 59th Cong., 1st
Sess. 76 (1906) (statement of Rep. Williams)).
57 UA W, 352 U.S. at 575.
58 Federal Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 68-506, § 302, 43 Stat. 1070, 1070-71
(1925) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982)).
59 War Labor Disputes Act, Pub. L. No. 78-89, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167-68 (1943)
(initial extension to labor organizations) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982));
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 304, 61 Stat.
136, 159-60 (1947) (broadening union prohibitions) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b
(1982)).
60 Taft-Hartley Act § 304. During investigations into the 1944 and 1946 cam-
paigns, special congressional committees read the word "contributions" narrowly so as
to confine the statute's prohibition to direct gifts or payments. Because contributors
could easily circumvent the statute with indirect contributions, the Taft-Hartley Act ex-
tended the prohibitions to expenditures. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 115
(1948).
61 Baldwin & Karpay, supra note 33, at 213 & n.21; Comment, From Dartmouth Col-
lege to Bellotti: The Political Career of the American Business Corporation, 6 Oio N.U.L. REv.
392, 396-98 (1979) (congressional actions from 1907 to 1976 demonstrate consistent
goal); see also FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982) (NRWfC)
(§ 441 b's legislative history illustrates gradual and cautious refinement to effect elimina-
tion of undue influence).
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dence and individual participation in democratic government.62
1. Buckley v. Valeo
The 1974 amendments faced immediate challenge in Buckley v.
Valeo.63 In Buckley, the Supreme Court directly addressed the consti-
tutionality of the newly amended statute and established a frame-
work for subsequent constitutional analysis of campaign finance
laws. The Court began its analysis by observing that political speech
is one "of the most fundamental First Amendment activities." 64
Political expression, the Court stated, merits exceptional protection
because "[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifica-
tions of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution." 65 The Court was sim-
ilarly protective of the right of association when it served political
ends.66
The FECA amendments did not directly restrict speech, but
they did restrict the ability of individuals and groups to expend
money in support of political candidates. 67 Finding that expendi-
tures of money are essential to effective advocacy, 68 the Buckley
Court concluded that the Act's contribution and expenditure limita-
tions restricted protected expression and the right of association. 69
These limitations prevented political associations from aggregating
individual contributions in order to amplify the voices of their
adherents. 7
0
62 See Baldwin & Karpay, supra note 33, at 213-15; see also NRWC, 459 U.S. at 207-
08.
63 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
64 Id. at 14.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 24-25; see supra note 28. Political associations' ability to amplify their ad-
herents' voices by aggregating individual contributions provides the basis for recogniz-
ing first amendment protection of the freedom of association. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.
67 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. The D.C. Circuit had upheld the FECA
contribution and expenditure limitations on the ground that they regulated not speech
but conduct. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 840-42 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
68 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. The Court's equation of money with speech reflects the
importance of the mass media in modem politics:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quan-
tity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth
of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is be-
cause virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass soci-
ety requires the expenditure of money.
Id. (footnote omitted).
69 Id. at 19-23.
70 Id. at 22. Freedom of association "is diluted if it does not include the right to
pool money through contributions, for funds are often essential if 'advocacy' is to be
truly or optimally 'effective.'" Id. at 65-66; see also NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 495 (limits on
expenditures by PACs "would subordinate the voices of those of modest means as op-
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The Court drew a critical distinction between direct contribu-
tions to political campaigns and independent expenditures in sup-
port of a candidate. The Act's expenditure limits constituted
"substantial" restraints on direct political speech. 71 The contribu-
tion limits, on the other hand, only entailed marginal restrictions on
protected expression because contributions only convey a general
message of support and because the limits did not "infringe the con-
tributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues."' 72 Applying
"rigorous" first amendment scrutiny, the Court sustained the con-
tribution limits. 73 Congress's concern for corruption justified the
limits because "[tlo the extent that large contributions are given to
secure a political quidpro quo from current and potential officer hold-
ers, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is un-
dermined." 74 The Court conceded that most contributors do not
seek improper influence with candidates. 75 Nevertheless, it held
that the restriction was not unconstitutionally overbroad because
"[n]ot only is it difficult to isolate suspect contributions but, more
importantly, Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in
safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that
the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large
monetary contributions be eliminated."
76
The FECA expenditure limitations failed the "exacting" scru-
tiny reserved for restrictions on "core" first amendment rights.77
First, in response to a challenge of unconstitutional vagueness, 78 the
Court construed the statute to apply only to expenditures expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a "dearly identified candi-
date."'79 The Court then found that independent expenditures did
not "presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corrup-
tion comparable to those identified with large campaign contribu-
posed to those sufficiently wealthy to be able to buy expensive media ads with their own
resources").
71 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
72 Id. at 21.
73 Id. at 29.
74 Id. at 26-27.
75 Id. at 29.
76 Id. at 30.
77 Id. at 44-45.
78 Id. at 40.
79 Id. at 44. The Court discussed two ways in which the statute might be vague.
The first possibility was the lack of a definition for the term "relative to" in the FECA
limitation on "any expenditure ... relative to a clearly defined candidate." Id. at 41-42.
The second concerned the difficulty when applying the statute of distinguishing "be-
tween discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candi-
dates." Id. at 42. The Court concluded "that in order to preserve the provision against
invalidation on vagueness grounds, [the expenditure ceilings] must be construed to ap-
ply only to expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the election
or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office." Id. at 44.
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tions."8 0 In addition, the Court rejected any governmental interest
in "equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influ-
ence the outcome of elections." 8 1 In the Court's view, "the concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly for-
eign to the First Amendment."8 2 Thus, while Congress could re-
strict political contributions, it could not limit an individual's or
group's expenditures for independent advocacy.
8 3
Although the Buckley Court did not address the provisions of
FECA concerning political contributions and expenditures by cor-
porations, its ruling that Congress may limit campaign contributions
of individuals and associations undoubtedly extends to corpora-
tions.8 4 Nevertheless, Buckley left unanswered the question whether
the first amendment might permit prohibition of independent cor-
porate expenditures, a distinct possibility if corporate political ex-
pression merits less protection than that of natural persons.85
2. First National Bank v. Bellotti
In First National Bank v. Bellotti,s6 the Supreme Court struck
down a statute regulating corporate political expenditures. Banking
and business corporations8 7 had challenged a Massachusetts crimi-
nal statute prohibiting expenditures by commercial corporations to
influence referendum votes unless the question submitted "materi-
ally affect[ed] any of the property, business or assets of the corpora-
80 Id. at 46. The Court concluded that "[tihe absence of prearrangement and coor-
dination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the
value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expendi-
tures will be given as a quidpro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." Id.
at 47.
81 Id. at 48.
82 Id. at 48-49.
83 Id. at 143. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun would have struck down
the contribution limits as well. Id. at 241 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), 290 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White
would have permitted both contribution and expenditure limits. Id. at 259 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84 The Supreme Court must uphold limits on corporate campaign contributions
unless it finds that corporations merit more first amendment protection than natural per-
sons or that corporate contributions pose less potential for actual or apparent corruption
than do noncorporate contributions.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 36-43; infra notes 180-202 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, even if corporate speech is theoretically protected to the same extent
as that of natural persons, it might be disproportionately restricted in light of a suffi-
ciently compelling interest specific to corporate speech. See infra notes 203-15 and ac-
companying text.
86 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
87 The appellants were the First National Bank of Boston, New England Merchants
National Bank, the Gillette Co., Digital Equipment Corp., and Wyman-Gordon Co. Id.
at 768 n.1.
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tion. ' '8 8 The statute established a conclusive presumption that
questions involving income, property, and sales taxes did not.89
The Bellotti plaintiffs wanted to expend money to voice their opposi-
tion to a proposed state constitutional amendment allowing the leg-
islature to impose a graduated income tax.90 The Court found that
the statute violated the first amendment.9 1 The decision did not,
however, establish a corporate right to political speech; rather, it
turned on the public's right to hear competing views on issues of
public concern.9
2
The Court had long recognized that effective self-government
demanded that the electorate have access to full information and
88 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 8 (Law. Co-op. 1978).
89 Id.
90 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 769.
91 Id. at 776.
92 The Court criticized the Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court's formulation of
the issue: "The proper question... is not whether corporations 'have' First Amend-
ment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. In-
stead, the question must be whether [the Massachusetts statute] abridges expression
that the First Amendment was meant to protect." Id. By shifting its focus from the
source to the content of the speech, the Court glossed over the question of exactly
whose first amendment rights were at issue. The Court's heavy reliance on press and
commercial speech precedents, however, indicates that it was expounding a societal
right to know:
[O]ur recent commercial speech cases ... illustrate that the First Amend-
ment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of indi-
viduals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information
from which members of the public may draw. A commercial advertise-
ment is constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to the
seller's business as because it furthers the societal interest in the "free
flow of commercial information."
Id. at 783 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)); see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903, 907 (1986) (plurality opinion) (citing Bellotti for proposition
that privately owned companies should not be prohibited from discussing controversial
political issues because "such prohibitions limit[] the range of information and ideas to
which the public is exposed").
The view that Bellotti turns not on a corporate right to speak, but rather on a public
right to hear, has wide support among commentators. See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 57-
58 (Supp. 1979) (decision turned on rights of Massachusetts voters to information);
Baker, supra note 8, at 657 (criticizing Bellotti Court's protection of corporate speech in
interests of listeners and marketplace of ideas); Baldwin & Karpay, supra note 33, at 223
(Bellotti "established that any 'right' that corporate entities might have to freedom of
speech derives solely from the public's 'right to listen.' "); Gray, Corporate Identity and
Corporate Political Activities, 21 AM. Bus. L.J. 439, 442 (1984) (Bellotti majority stressed
"societal right to know" rather than right to self-expression); Kiley, supra note 40, at 429
(Bellotti "was logically premised upon the identification of the public's right to receive
information as a fundamental, underlying value of the first amendment."); Nicholson,
supra note 30, at 952 (majority did not recognize corporate first amendment rights). But
see Miller, On Politics, Democracy, and the First Amendment. A Commentary on First National
Bank v. Bellotti, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 21, 22 (1981) ("[T]he Court reasoned that the
corporation is a constitutional person and, accordingly, it is to be treated as any other
person ... when first amendment issues are raised.").
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competing views. 93 Typically, this reasoning only buttressed deci-
sions also implicating speakers' rights.94 Relying on precedents
from press and commercial speech cases, 95 the Court in Bellotti for
the first time relied solely on the listener's right to hear to protect
political expression.96 The question remained whether the speaker's
corporate status justified state regulation burdening this right.
97
The Court deemed the three governmental interests forwarded
to justify the statute either inapplicable or insufficiently compelling
to justify the restriction. 98 First, the Court acknowledged that pre-
vention of "corruption of elected representatives through the crea-
tion of political debts," or the appearance of such corruption, was
the most important justification for restrictions on corporate ex-
penditures in candidate elections.99 This interest, however, was inap-
plicable to a referendum on a public issue.100 Second, the state
suggested that corporate expression in a referendum debate would
so dominate campaigns that it would drown out competing points of
view, thereby impeding the listeners' right to hear.10' In contrast to
Buckley, where the Court flatly rejected a similar argument, 10 2 the
Bellotti Court implied that it considered this argument theoretically
valid.' 0 3 The Court nevertheless rejected the state's contention in
the instant case because "there ha[d] been no showing that the rela-
tive voice of corporations ha[d] been overwhelming or even signifi-
cant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts, or that there ha[d]
been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in govern-
93 See supra notes 10 & 13 and accompanying text.
94 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
95 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 782-83; see also Baldwin & Karpay, supra note 33, at 224
(Bellotti involved extension of rationale of commercial speech cases).
96 See supra notes 40 & 91-92 and accompanying text.
97 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786.
98 Id. at 787-88. The Court professed to subject the challenged Massachusetts stat-
ute to "exacting" scrutiny, id. at 786, declaring that "where, as here, a prohibition is
directed at speech itself, and the speech is intimately related to the process of governing,
'the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compel-
ling.'" Id. ((footnote omitted) (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960))). However, the Court never balanced the governmental interests against the
first amendment right involved. Instead, it dismissed the Massachusetts statute's princi-
pal justifications as "either... not implicated in this case or... not served at all, or in
other than a random manner, by the prohibition in" the statute. Id. at 788; see Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903, 913 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(citing Bellotti as requiring compelling interest); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1980) (same).
99 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
100 Id. at 790.
101 Id. at 789.
102 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
103 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969)).
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ment."' 10 4 Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the legisla-
ture intended the statute to protect shareholders by preventing use
of corporate funds to further political views with which the share-
holders might disagree, finding the statute both underinclusive and
overinclusive as to that purpose. 0 5
The Supreme Court explicitly limited Bellotti to referendum
elections and stressed that "under different circumstances, a justifi-
cation for a restriction on speech that would be inadequate as ap-
plied to individuals might suffice to sustain the same restriction as
applied to corporations, unions, or like entities."' 0 6 In particular,
the Court suggested that the governmental interests forwarded-
"sustaining the active role of the individual citizen" and "protecting
the rights of shareholders"-might receive greater weight in the
candidate election context.10 7 The Court also noted that the impor-
tance of section 44 lb's primary justification-the prevention of cor-
ruption of elected officials-"has never been doubted" in the
context of candidate elections. 08
Buckley and Bellotti delimit an area of unsettled law. In general
terms, Buckley permits governmental restrictions on political contri-
104 Id. at 789-90 (footnote omitted). Justice White, on the other hand, thought "that
Massachusetts' most recent experience with unrestrained corporate expenditures in con-
nection with ballot questions establishes precisely the contrary." Id. at 810-11 (White,
J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 792-95 (majority). The statute was deemed underinclusive because it failed
to prohibit corporate lobbying of legislators or corporate expenditures for advocacy on
public issues which were not the subject of a referendum. Id. at 793. The statute was
overinclusive because it "would prohibit a corporation from supporting or opposing a
referendum proposal even if its shareholders unanimously authorized the contribution
or expenditure." Id. at 794.
In fact, the Court's suspicion of the Massachusetts legislators' sincerity may have
influenced its rejection of the state's argument that the statute was intended to protect
shareholders. The Court observed that "[t]he fact that a particular kind of ballot ques-
tion [those relating to a state income tax] has been singled out for special treatment
undermines the likelihood of a genuine state interest in protecting shareholders. It sug-
gests instead that the legislature may have been concerned with silencing corporations
on a particular subject." Id. at 793.
106 Id. at 777 n.13. The reference to unions suggests Court concern with Bellotti's
impact on § 441b. That section, in contrast to the Massachusetts statute, applies to un-
ions as well as to corporations. The Court also emphasized that it was not addressing
"the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individ-
uals enjoy under the First Amendment." Id. at 777.
107 Id. at 787-88 & 788 n.26.
108 Id. at 788 n.26. The Court continued:
[O]ur consideration of a corporation's right to speak on issues of general
public interest implies no comparable right in the quite different context
of participation in a political campaign for election to public office. Con-
gress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real
or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to
influence candidate elections.
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butions, but prohibits similar restrictions on independent expendi-
tures in support of a candidate, at least when made by individuals
and unincorporated associations. Bellotti prohibits restrictions on
independent corporate expenditures in connection with referendum
campaigns. 0 9 Neither of these cases nor subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have addressed whether the first amendment pro-
tects independent corporate expenditures in support of political
candidates." 0
109 Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290 (1981), supports Bellotti dictum that the Bellotti holding did not predeter-
mine the Court's position with respect to corporate expenditures in a candidate election.
In Citizens Against Rent Control, an unincorporated association, formed to oppose a rent
control measure, challenged a city ordinance's $250 limit on contributions to commit-
tees created to support or oppose ballot measures. The Supreme Court concluded that
a referendum lacked the danger of candidate corruption; thus, even a contribution limit
similar to the one sustained in Buckley unconstitutionally impaired the organization's
right of association. Id. at 297-99. The Court believed that the statute's public filing
and disclosure requirements adequately protected the "integrity of the political system."
Id. at 299-300.
110 Two recent cases, FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982)
(NRWC), and FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480
(1985) (NCPAC), deserve special mention. NRWC examined § 441b(b) and suggests
that the Court may approach this section with considerably more deference than it did
the FECA amendments involved in Buckley and the Massachusetts statute challenged in
Bellotti. Although § 441b(a) flatly prohibits corporate political contributions and ex-
penditures, § 44lb(b) permits corporations to establish and administer a "separate seg-
regated fund" to be financed by voluntary contributions from corporate employees and
shareholders. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1982). These segregated funds may be "uti-
lized for political purposes," id., subject to reporting and disclosure requirements. See 2
U.S.C. §§ 432-434 (1982).
In NRWC, the FEC determined that a nonprofit ideological corporation had vio-
lated 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4) (1982), which prohibits corporations without capital stock
from soliciting, except from "members," contributions to separate segregated funds.
459 U.S. at 200. The Court concluded that the statute prophylactically regulated
NRWC's protected expression, yet sustained the statute in light of Congress's judgment
that the corporate form posed a unique threat of actual and apparent corruption. Refer-
ring to § 44 1b's history, the court said "[t]his careful legislative adjustment of the fed-
eral electoral laws, in a 'cautious advance, step by step,' . . . warrants considerable
deference." Id. at 209 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46
(1937)).
Arguably, NRWC turns on the kind of expression involved: the solicitations in ques-
tion resembled contributions more than expenditures and as such merited less first
amendment protection under the Buckley rule. See NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 495 (NRWC de-
cided "in view of the well-established constitutional validity of legislative regulation of
corporate contributions to candidates for public office"); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 646, 648 n.4 (D. Mass. 1984) (NRWC not controlling on issue
of corporate expenditures because it only addressed legality of solicitation of contribu-
tions); see also California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (plurality opin-
ion) (medical association's contributions to PAC are "speech by proxy" rather than
direct political advocacy, so not entitled to full first amendment protection). Neverthe-
less, the Court's cautious approach to the federal statute in NRWC stands in marked
contrast to the Court's treatment of the Massachusetts statute involved in Bellotti.
The second case, NCPAC, involved an enforcement action against two nonprofit ide-
ological corporations for violation of a federal statute that restricts PAC expenditures in
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FEC v. MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE, INC.
A. Facts Leading to the Controversy
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., a nonprofit ideological
corporation, was established "[tlo foster respect for human life and
to defend the right to life of all human beings, born and unborn,
through education, political and other forms of activities.""'1 The
organization mailed a newsletter published at irregular intervals"
12
to "[d]ues-paying and contributing members" and, subject to avail-
able funds, to "non-contributing members." ' 1 3 In 1978, MCFL dis-
tributed newsletters to approximately 2,000 to 3,000 people."
14
MCFL also published special edition newsletters prior to elec-
tions. In September 1978, it printed 100,000 copies of a "Special
Election Edition" urging readers to vote for pro-life candidates." 15
This edition included state and federal incumbents' voting records
on abortion-related issues, challengers' answers to MCFL question-
naires, 116 and photographs of pro-life candidates. 117 MCFL subse-
quently printed 20,000 copies of a "Complimentary Partial Special
Election Edition" containing minor changes. 118 MCFL distributed
copies of the special election editions to 5,985 contributors, to
50,674 noncontributors, and to local chapters. 1" 9 It may have dis-
tributed free copies to the general public.' 20 Funds from MCFL's
support of presidential candidates who elect to receive public financing. The Court held
the statute unconstitutional, but distinguished the case from its "corporate" precedents,
emphasizing that the statute in question also applied to unincorporated associations.
470 U.S. at 496.
1I FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 769 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1985),prob.
juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986). The court derived this formulation from MCFL's
"Statement of Purpose":
In recognition of the fact that each human life is a continuum from con-
ception to natural death, the objective of this organization is to foster
respect for human life and to defend the right to life of all human beings,
born and unborn, through educational, political, and other forms of
activity.
Brief for Appellee at 2-3, MCFL, 769 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1985) (No. 84-1719) (on file at
Cornell Law Review).
112 MCFL published the newsletter from three to eight times a year between 1973
and 1978 inclusive. MCFL, 769 F.2d at 15 n.1.
113 Id. at 15. MCFL, legally a "non-membership corporation," nevertheless recog-
nized categories of "members." Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Brief for Appellee, supra note 111, at 5.
117 769 F.2d at 15.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 The FEC alleged that the remainder of the newsletters were "left in public areas
for general distribution." Id. at 15-16.
177
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general treasury covered all publishing and distribution costs.1 2 1
The Federal Election Commission brought a civil enforcement
action against MCFL for violation of section 441 b. The FEC alleged
that MCFL's use of corporate funds to finance the special election
editions, combined with their public distribution, constituted a pro-
hibited expenditure in support of federal candidates. 122
B. The District Court's Grant of Summary Judgment
The district court granted MCFL's motion for summary judg-
ment, 123 concluding on two grounds that section 441b did not pro-
hibit the expenditure at issue. First, by narrowly defining
"contribution or expenditure,"' 124 the court held that section 441b
prohibited only direct or indirect payments or gifts to a candidate,
campaign committee, political party, or organization.' 25 Thus, the
statute failed to reach the MCFL newsletter, for it was "uninvited by
any candidate and uncoordinated with any campaign."' 26 Second,
the newsletter qualified for section 441b's exception for a "'news
story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of
any ... periodical publication.' "127
121 Id. at 16.
122 Id. at 15-16.
123 MCFL, 589 F. Supp. at 653.
124 Section 441b(b)(2) states that
the term "contribution or expenditure" shall include any direct or indirect
payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any
services, or anything of value.., to any candidate, campaign committee,
or political party or organization, in connection with any election to any
of the offices referred to in this section, but shall not include ... (C) the
establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a sepa-
rate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corpora-
tion, labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or
corporation without capital stock.
2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). In addition, the general definitions sec-
tion of FECA defines "expenditure": "The term 'expenditure' includes-any purchase,
payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value,
made by any personfor the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office ...... 2
U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i) (1982) (emphasis added). The district court chose the
§ 441b(b)(2) definition and, despite the statute's phrase "shall include," concluded that
the statute only prohibited payments or gifts "to any candidate, campaign committee or
political party or organization." MCFL, 589 F. Supp. at 649.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 650 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (1982)). Section 431 contains the
"periodical publication" exception:
(B) The term "expenditure" does not include-
(i) any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the
facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other peri-
odical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any
political party, political committee, or candidate[.]
2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (1982).
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The court ruled "[a]lternatively, and conditionally," 128 that
"[i]f § 441b were intended by Congress to prohibit MCFL's expend-
itures of printing and distributing the newsletters in question, it
would be unconstitutional ... as applied to MCFL because violative
of MCFL's freedoms of speech, press and association."' 129 Accord-
ing to the district court, only the prevention of real or apparent cor-
ruption could justify prohibition of MCFL's special editions, and
MCFL's expenditures posed no such danger.' 30
C. The Court of Appeals' Affirmance
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment.' 3 ' Although the court held that the special
election editions fell within section 441b's scope, 132 it agreed with
the district court that the statute was unconstitutional as applied.' 33
After an extensive discussion of section 441b's legislative history,
the court concluded that section 441b prohibited expenditures "in
connection with federal elections as well as ependitures made to
candidates for federal office."' 134 The court found that the MCFL
newsletters "expressly advocated the election of clearly identified
candidates" and thus qualified as expenditures under the Buckley
standard. 135 The court also concluded that MCFL's expenditures
fell outside the exception for periodical publications because the
special election editions (1) did not qualify as newspapers,
magazines, or periodical publications, 136 (2) were not "news
128 MCFL, 589 F. Supp. at 653.
129 Id. at 651.
130 Id. at 651-52.
131 MCFL, 769 F.2d at 15, 20-23.
132 Id. at 20-22.
133 Id. at 22-23.
134 Id. at 20. The First Circuit preferred § 431's broader definition of "expendi-
ture," see supra note 124, but also noted that the word "include," present in both defini-
tions, "'is usually a term of enlargement, and not of limitation.' "MCFL, 769 F.2d at 17
(quoting United States v. Gertz, 249 F.2d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 1957)). "Therefore, the
plain language of the statute suggests that 'expenditure' in both contexts includes but is
not limited to contributions to candidates, campaign committees, or political organiza-
tions." Id.
135 Id. at 20; see supra text accompanying note 79. By finding express advocacy, the
First Circuit had no need to decide whether § 441b actually contained an express advo-
cacy requirement. MCFL, 769 F.2d at 20. The district court in MCFL had noted, with-
out reference to Buckley, that the MCFL special edition newsletters were "without
express advocacy of the election of a particular candidate." 589 F. Supp. at 651.
136 The court based its conclusion on the following observation:
MCFL published these editions not periodically, but sporadically, and
only during federal election campaigns. Moreover, at least 50,000 copies
of the special editions were distributed at no cost to a large number of
people; and the editions contained no printed volume or issue number
nor [sic] any masthead designating them as newspapers or periodicals.
MCFL, 769 F.2d at 21.
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
stor[ies], commentar[ies], or editorial[s] distributed through the fa-
cilities of any ... newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publica-
tion,"' 3 7 and (3) were not "one of the 'normal functions of a press
entity.' "138
The First Circuit never addressed the source or nature of
MCFL's first amendment rights; rather, it assumed their exist-
ence.' 39 The court first classified section 441b as a content-based
restriction, rather than a time, place, or manner restriction. As
such, only a showing of a substantial governmental interest, the
court stated, could justify the statute.' 40 The court then concluded
that the legislative purposes underlying section 441b were insuffi-
ciently compelling tojustify the burden on MCFL's first amendment
rights.
The FEC argued first that section 441b did not affect MCFL's
first amendment rights at all because the statute permitted the use
of corporate funds to establish and administer a separate, segre-
gated fund for political purposes.' 4 ' The court, however, rejected
the notion "that the availability of alternative methods of funding
speech justifies eliminating the simplest method."' 14
2
The court then evaluated two governmental interests: that
Congress intended section 441b to prevent the use of corporate
political "war chests" to corrupt elected officials, and to protect per-
sons paying money into a corporation or union from having the
money contributed to candidates they oppose. 143 The court found
the first rationale inapplicable because MCFL did not contribute di-
137 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (1982). For purposes of argument, the court assumed
that the regular MCFL newsletters qualified as periodical publications. MCFL, 769 F.2d
at 21. Nevertheless, it concluded that the special election editions did not qualify for the
exception because (1) their circulation far exceeded that of the regular newsletter, (2)
they did not contain the regular newsletter masthead or printed volume or issue num-
bers, and (3) they were not compiled and published by the regular newsletter's staff. Id.
138 Id. (quoting FEC v. Phillips Publishing, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1308, 1313 (D.D.C.
1981)).
139 The court noted that the district court had conditionally found the statute 'vio-
lative of MCFL's freedoms of speech, press[] and association,' "id. at 22 (quoting MCFL,
589 F. Supp. at 651), but itself spoke generically of MCFL's "First Amendment rights."
Id. at 22-23. One cannot interpret the First Circuit's decision as an affirmance of the
district court's specific characterization of those rights because the appellate court's
treatment of the periodical publication exception, see supra notes 136-38 and accompany-
ing text, clearly indicates that it would not have found a freedom of the press violation.
140 MCFL, 769 F.2d at 22.
141 Id. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1982) (authorizing separate segregated fund
for political purposes); supra note 124. After the FEC brought suit, MCFL did establish a
statutory political fund. MCFL, 589 F. Supp. at 647 n.1. For discussion of the signifi-
cance of the separate segregated fund alternative to this Note's analysis, see infra notes
190-93 and accompanying text.
142 MCFL, 769 F.2d at 22.
143 Id. at 22-23.
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rectly to any political campaigns and therefore incurred no political
debts. 144 The second rationale failed because MCFL's contributors
presumably concurred with the corporation's political agenda.
145
Consequently, the court held "that the application of section 441b
to indirect, uncoordinated expenditures by a non-profit ideological
corporation expressing its views of political candidates violates the




The Supreme Court should affirm the First Circuit's holding in
light of MCFL's ideological purpose.' 47 A prohibition of candidate
election expenditures by commercial corporations, on the other
hand, should survive first amendment scrutiny. The difference in
result for ideological and commercial corporations turns principally
on the difference in first amendment interests involved: whereas an
ideological corporation's political expression implicates both Buck-
ky's right of association and Bellotti's right to hear, a commercial cor-
poration's political expression implicates only the latter.
Only a compelling governmental interest can justify a restric-
tion on direct political expression.' 48 In addition, the Court de-
mands a high degree of precision when the restriction burdens the
right of association. 149 Section 441b fails this second standard. The
right to hear, on the other hand, provides more qualified first
amendment protection than does the right of association. 150 As a
consequence, the Court should defer more readily to prophylactic
regulations of expression that burden only the right to hear. 151
144 Id. at 23. The court apparently applied the Buckley standard, see supra note 80 and
accompanying text, as a per se rule.
145 MCFL, 769 F.2d at 23. The court also rejected the FEC argument that NRWC
controlled the case, distinguishing NRWC as essentially a contribution case, rather than
an expenditure case. Id.; see supra note 110.
146 MCFL, 769 F.2d at 23.
147 This Note focuses on the first amendment protection afforded corporate political
expression by using the MCFL case as a vehicle for exploring the first amendment signif-
icance of ideological or commercial purpose. The following analysis accepts the First
Circuit's statutory analysis as substantially correct.
148 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
149 See supra note 28, infra note 156 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 36-43, infra notes 181-93 and accompanying text.
151 Commentators divide sharply on the degree of deference the Court should ac-
cord congressional determinations of the corrupting potential and anti-democratic effect
of campaign spending and of the need for prophylactic regulation. Compare Wright, supra
note 4, at 636 (calling for Supreme Court to overrule Buckley and Bellotti as inconsistent
with first amendment goal of diversity and as barriers to attempts to counter "the stifling
influence of money in politics"); Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Foreword: Freedom of
Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1, 69-70 (1980) (Court has substituted its
judgment for that of legislature as to "the extent and seriousness of the danger" of
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When evaluated under this deferential approach, the governmental
interests supporting section 441b justify the section's application to
commercial corporations.
A. Ideological Corporations
1. First Amendment Protection
A nonprofit ideological corporation's expenditures in support
of like-minded political candidates fall squarely within the first
amendment's protection of the right of association. 152 A distinct
ideological focus and an explicit advocacy purpose ensure that such
organizations amplify the voice of their adherents.' 53 For example,
MCFL's anti-abortion election newsletters represented expression
consistent with the organization's basic ideological purpose: to ad-
vocate pro-life positions. 154 The newsletter therefore fell within the
scope of the right of association. Moreover, such independent ex-
penditures, as direct expression of a political nature, merit excep-
independent political expenditures) with BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the
First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1082-90 (1985)
(calling for intense judicial scrutiny of legislative ends and means in campaign finance
area).
This Note argues that the Court has adopted strict scrutiny of means when review-
ing independent expenditures protected by the rights of speech and of association; that
the Court has applied a more lenient standard to contributions; and that the Court is
free to (and indeed should) adopt lenient review of means for both contributions and
expenditures protected solely by the right to hear.
If the right to hear does provide the same order of protection as the traditional rights
of speech and association, then political speech's source becomes irrelevant, with differ-
ences in first amendment protection deriving solely from content. See Kiley, supra note
40, at 442-43 (describing Court's "drift away from the doctrine of content neutrality and
toward a sliding scale of first amendment protection based on the content of speech").
An unqualified right to hear would effectively grant corporations first amendment rights
equivalent to those of natural persons. It would, in the absence of corporate-specific
compelling governmental interests, preclude any restrictions on independent corporate
political expenditures. Some commentators think that Bellotti compels this result. See,
e.g., Bolton, Constitutional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union Political Speech, 22
ARIz. L. REV. 373, 418 (1980) ("Although the validity of prohibiting corporate and
union independent expenditures was highly dubious after Buckley, Bellotti appears to
have ended any remaining doubt." (footnote omitted)).
Courts need not interpret Bellotti's right to hear doctrine so broadly. By focusing on
the inherent qualifications of a first amendment protection derived from the listeners'
interests, this Note suggests a method of integrating right-to-hear analysis with the
traditional source-oriented political expression case law, while retaining differential pro-
tection for the speech of natural and artificial persons. See infra notes 194-202 and ac-
companying text.
152 See NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 494 ("First Amendment freedom of association is
squarely implicated" by conservative ideological corporation's expenditures in support
of President Reagan's re-election); supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
153 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22 ("amplifying the voice of their adherents [is] the origi-
nal basis for the recognition of First Amendment protection of the freedom of associa-
tion"); see also NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 494 (quoting Buckley).
154 MCFL, 769 F.2d at 15.
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tional first amendment protection.15 5 Consequently, section 441b's
prohibition can survive first amendment scrutiny only if it consti-
tutes a narrowly tailored means of furthering a compelling govern-
mental interest.156 Broad legislative determinations regarding the
threat posed by corporate campaign expenditures will not suffice.
Instead, the statute must be tested as applied to ideological corpora-
tions and to the specific expenditure in question.
157
2. Governmental Interests
Three governmental interests support section 441b's prohibi-
tions: protecting shareholders, maintaining voter confidence and
citizen participation, and preventing actual and apparent corrup-
tion.158 Only the third interest is relevant to political expenditures
by an ideological corporation. Nevertheless, the statute is an insuffi-
ciently precise response to the problem of corruption of elected offi-
cials. Furthermore, it is unconstitutional as applied because MCFL's
special election newsletters posed no threat of quid pro quo. 159
Section 441b reflects Congress's concern, first, that corporate
155 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
156 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. This last point requires elaboration in
light of the NRWC Court's treatment of section 441b(b). In NRWC, the Court deferred
to Congress's judgment as to both the dangers inherent in corporate political activities
and the need for prophylactic regulation. See supra note 110. In MCFL, the FEC argued
that NRWC sustained the constitutionality of § 441b as a whole, Brief for Appellant at
33, MCFL, 769 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1985) (No. 84-1719) (on file at Cornell Law Review), and
that the Court "has rejected the approach .. of reassessing the applicability of the
governmental interests in each specific instance." Id. at 36. NRWC's deferential ap-
proach is inappropriate in the instant case. Even though the defendant in NRWC was an
ideological corporation, the case did not involve direct political expenditures, which im-
plicate "core First Amendment rights of political expression." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45; see
supra note 110.
The Court consistently conducts rigorous review in cases involving both direct ex-
penditures and the right of association. In particular, the Court demands means
"closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms." Buckley,
424 U.S. at 25; see NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 498-501 (finding statute restricting independent
expenditures of political action committees fatally overbroad); supra notes 71-83 and
accompanying text; see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978) (" 'Broad prophylactic
rules in the area of free expression are suspect,' and... '[pirecision of regulation must
be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.'" (quot-
ing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963))).
157 See In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 434 (requiring case-specific evidence of adverse con-
sequences when client-solicitation prohibition implicates ACLU attorney's political ex-
pression and association).
158 See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
159 Except for MCFL's corporate form, MCFL is indistinguishable frotfi Buckley,
which held that restrictions on an unincorporated association's independent expendi-
tures impermissibly burdened the right of association. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-51.
NCPAC held campaign expenditure limitations unconstitutional as applied to incorporated
political action committees. The NCPAC opinion, however, stressed that the statute in-
volved applied to unincorporated associations; the statute's purpose was not, therefore,
tied to the special characteristics of corporate form. 470 U.S. at 496.
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managers should not be permitted to spend corporate funds to sup-
port candidates that shareholders might oppose. 160 In a case involv-
ing one of section 441b's predecessors, the Court referred to
Congress's belief that "corporate officials had no moral right to use
corporate funds for contribution to political parties without the con-
sent of the stockholders."' t61 Nevertheless, the shareholder protec-
tion interest cannot justify restrictions on a nonprofit ideological
corporation's political expression. As the First Circuit recognized,
MCFL's contributors need no such protection; they support MCFL
precisely because they wish to amplify their political expression. 162
Generally, the shareholder protection interest does not apply to any
corporate expression implicating the right of association because
that right attaches only to expression reflecting the interests of the
association's members.
163
The Court has indicated that the second governmental interest,
sustaining the active participation of the individual citizen in the
electoral process, might justify restrictions on corporate expendi-
tures if supported by a record or legislative finding of corporate
domination of political discussion.' 64 This interest would not, how-
160 See supra notes 56 & 62 and accompanying text.
161 United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948). Similarly, the extension of the
prohibition to union expenditures, War Labor Disputes Act, Pub. L. No. 78-89, § 9, 57
Stat. 163, 167-68 (1943) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982)), in part re-
flected a legislative judgment that allowing the union to make contributions from gen-
eral union funds to a political party which the individual member might oppose was
unfair to the individual union member. 335 U.S. at 115.
The weight the Court actually accords this interest is uncertain. Justice Powell's
majority opinion in Bellotti casts serious doubt on the utility of the shareholder protec-
tion interest. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. In contrast, the NRWC Court
relied on this interest, in combination with concern for the prevention of corruption, to
justify a statute restricting corporate solicitation of contributions to a separate segre-
gated fund. 459 U.S. at 207-08.
162 The First Circuit stated:
Individuals who contribute to MCFL do so because they support MCFL's
anti-abortion position and presumably would favor expenditures for a
publication that informs contributors and others of the position of vari-
ous candidates on the abortion issue. That would appear to be the very
purpose of the organization and the contributions to it.
MCFL, 769 F.2d at 23; see also supra notes 27 & 70 and accompanying text (ideological
corporations generally).
163 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
164 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-89; see supra notes 10 1-04 and accompanying text; see also
Note, Independent Expenditures: Can Survey Research Establish a Link to Declining Citizen Confi-
dence in Government?, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 763, 764-65, 783 (1983) (Court is appar-
ently willing to consider empirical data of declining voter confidence). One
commentator who thought Bellotti a decision of major theoretical importance admitted
that one could read the case narrowly as holding "that the Commonwealth simply failed
to meet its burden of demonstrating that corporate financial participation in a political
campaign would unduly influence the electoral process." Kiley, supra note 40, at 429
n.1l.
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ever, justify restrictions on expenditures by nonprofit ideological
corporations because of the advocacy nature of such organizations.
Rather than alienating the electorate, political expenditures by ideo-
logical corporations facilitate citizen involvement in politics.1 65 In-
deed, by allowing contributors to pool their resources and amplify
their voices, ideological corporations empower "those of modest
means .. .to be able to buy expensive media ads with their own
resources."' 66 The corporate form in no way alters this facilitative
function.
Congress's third concern-preventing real and apparent polit-
ical corruption-provided the driving force behind section 44 lb,
167
and the Court has readily deferred to this governmental interest.1
6 8
Admittedly, the Buckley Court thought that independent expendi-
tures posed only a minimal threat of corruption, regardless of the
circumstances.169 Nevertheless, in a legal regime that substantially
restricts contributions, uncoordinated expenditures may pose a sig-
nificant potential for abuse. 170 Ideological corporations could con-
165 See Emerson, supra note 19, at 4, 22.
166 NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 495.
167 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
168 The NRWC Court exemplified this deference, stating that it would not "second-
guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corrup-
tion is the evil feared." 459 U.S. at 210; see supra note 110. In NCPAC, the Court stated
that "[w]e held in Buckley and reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent Control that preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling gov-
ernment interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances." 470 U.S. at 496-
97. However, neither Buckley nor Citizens Against Rent Control involved corporate campaign
financing, and the Court apparently fears a greater potential for corruption in the corpo-
rate form itself. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
169 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47; see supra note 80 and accompanying text; see also
NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497-98 (quid pro quo arrangements unlikely where expenditures are
uncoordinated with campaign and no prearrangement with candidate). The First Circuit
apparently viewed this conclusion as a formal rule, as evidenced by its statement that
"[b]ecause MCFL did not contribute directly to a political campaign, MCFL's expendi-
tures did not incur any political debts from legislators." MCFL, 769 F.2d at 23. The
First Circuit's view is, however, unwarranted; the Buckley Court recognized that even
independent expenditures that do not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
candidate pose some threat of corruption. 424 U.S. at 45.
170 For example, one would expect that, after Buckley, large contributors would shift
their financing strategies in favor of large independent expenditures. Even in the ab-
sence of prearrangement and coordination, political candidates likely would note this
support, tempting them to reward it with political favors. See NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 510
(White, J., dissenting) ("The growth of independent PAC spending has been a direct
and openly acknowledged response to the contribution limits in the FECA."); id. at 519-
21 (Marshall,J, dissenting) (concluding that he was wrong to hold with Buckley majority
on contribution/expenditure distinction because expenditures carry significant potential
for corruption); SENATE REPORT, supra note 50, at 19 ("[T]o prohibit a $60,000 direct
contribution to be used for a TV spot commercial but then to permit the would-be con-
tributor to purchase the time himself, and place a commercial endorsing the candidate,
would exalt constitutional form over substance."), reprinted in FEC, supra note 50, at 115;
Nicholson, supra note 30, at 991 (if contributions may be restricted but expenditures
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ceivably exact favors from elected officials who benefitted from such
expenditures; so, however, could unincorporated associations and
individuals. Unless corporate form itself increases the corrupting
potential of an ideological corporation's expenditures, application
of the Buckley rule would require finding that section 441b unconsti-
tutionally burdens the right of association.
171
The peculiar corrupting potential of corporate expenditures
stems from the corporation's unique ability to aggregate wealth for
political "war chests."' 172 Assuming, however, that some ideological
corporations may in fact accumulate substantial campaign "war
chests," their ability to do so does not turn on their corporate form.
Although sale of ownership shares provides a business corporation
with a unique tool for accumulating capital, incorporation provides
a purely nonprofit organization with no comparable financing ad-
vantage. Nonprofit organizations, corporate and noncorporate
alike, depend primarily on membership dues to finance their activi-
ties. 173 Corporate form itself, therefore, does not increase an ideo-
logical corporation's potential for corrupting candidates.
Furthermore, not all ideological corporations accumulate or spend
corporate funds to influence elections. 174 Consequently, to the ex-
may not, candidates will come to rely on large expenditures, increasing their corrupting
potential).
171 See supra note 159.
172 NRWC, 459 U.S. at 207-08. In addition, a commercial corporation's political ex-
penditures may appear particularly suspect because all of its expenditures are prima
facie aimed at economic returns. Nicholson, supra note 30, at 991; see Baker, supra note
8, at 653-54 (market and profit-maximization dictate contents of corporation's political
expression). In contrast, a nonprofit ideological corporation's political expenditures
suggest no comparable pecuniary motive. Furthermore, an ideological corporation's ex-
penditures would appear no more suspect than equivalent expenditures by an unincor-
porated ideological association.
The NRWC Court recognized that the potential size of corporations creates a spe-
cial danger, noting that "[w]hile § 441b restricts the solicitation of corporations and
labor unions without great financial resources, as well as those more fortunately situ-
ated, we accept Congress' judgment that it is the potential for such influence that de-
mands regulation." 459 U.S. at 210. Such deference to a legislative judgment may be
appropriate for the solicitation of contributions or where the only first amendment right
implicated is the right to hear. However, such regulation is clearly overbroad when ap-
plied to direct political expression implicating the freedom of association. In concluding
that the statute challenged in NCPAC was hopelessly overbroad, the Court remarked that
"[w]e are not quibbling over fine-tuning of prophylactic limitations, but are concerned
about wholesale restriction of clearly protected conduct." 470 U.S. at 501.
173 See H. OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS
§ 45, at 90 (4th ed. 1980). Nonprofit membership organizations incorporate for reasons
other than raising capital. See id. § 7, at 31 (advantages of corporate form include con-
tinuity of existence, limited liability, and more precise governing law than is available for
unincorporated associations).
174 The Internal Revenue Code provides strong incentives for a nonprofit ideologi-
cal corporation to refrain from political activity. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982) exempts from
taxation "[c]orporations ... organized and operated exclusively for ... educational
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tent that the corporate form's unique potential for amassing wealth
justifies section 441b, the statute is overbroad and lacks the preci-
sion demanded by the right of association's protection of direct
political expression.' 75 In particular, MCFL's corporate form is ir-
relevant, and the Buckley rule prohibiting restrictions on independ-
ent expenditures should extend to the MCFL expenditures. 76 Even
a generous expenditure limit, as opposed to section 441b's flat pro-
hibition, would fail because an ideological corporation's large ex-
penditures deserve as much first amendment protection as small
ones.' 77 More fundamentally, concentration of the resources of
many individuals is the very basis for right of association protec-
tion.178 Only a statute requiring specific proof of corruption would
prove sufficiently precise. 179
In sum, of the three governmental interests supporting section
441b's prohibition, only the concern for preventing corruption has
any bearing on an ideological corporation's candidate election ex-
penditures. The statute, however, proscribes both improper and in-
nocent expenditures. It thus fails to provide narrowly tailored
means and is therefore unconstitutional as applied.
B. Commercial Corporations
1. First Amendment Protection
The right to hear provides the sole first amendment protection
for a commercial corporation's speech' 80 and therefore defines the
purposes," but only if they do not substantially "participate in, or intervene in (includ-
ing the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any
candidate for public office." Education is broadly defined to include instruction to the
general public as well as to individuals. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (as
amended in 1976); B. HoPINs, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPr ORGANIZATIONS § 7.3 (4th ed.
1983); cf. id. § 7.5 (on distinction between education and propaganda), §§ 14.3-.4 (dis-
tinguishing between educational or political activities and treatment of activist organiza-
tions). Similarly, but to a lesser degree, the Code discourages "social welfare"
organizations, I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (1982), from engaging in political activities. See B.
HOPKINS, supra, §§ 15A, 16.4.
175 See NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 501 (even if expenditures by large PACs pose danger of
corruption, a prohibition extending to all PACs regardless of size is unconstitutionally
overbroad); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434-38 (1978) (finding that right of association
protects against imprecise prophylactic regulation).
176 See supra note 159.
177 Indeed, the MCFL expenditure was a small one. The MCFL newsletters listed
the abortion-related positions of nearly 500 candidates at a total cost of under $10,000,
for an average expenditure of approximately $20 per candidate. MCFL, 589 F. Supp. at
649. Segregating the relative space allotted federal and state candidates, the district
court attributed $4,000 of the cost of the newsletters to 50 federal candidates, an aver-
age expenditure of $80 per candidate. Id. at 650.
178 See supra notes 26 & 66.
179 See supra note 157.
180 See supra notes 14 & 92 and accompanying text; Nicholson, supra note 30, at 961
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limits of constitutional protection for a commercial corporation's
political expression. However, the degree to which the right to hear
protects political expression remains uncertain.' 8 1 In the area of
commercial speech, upon which the Bellotti majority relied heavily to
support its right to hear analysis, the right to hear provides only
qualified protection. 82 The Court has never indicated whether
these qualifications on the protection afforded commercial speech
also apply to a commercial corporation's political speech. Neverthe-
less, because the right to hear protects expression in the interests of
listeners and not speakers, it is necessarily subject to qualifications
inapplicable to the rights of speech and association. The right to
hear protects a commercial corporation's political expression only
to the extent that it furthers the listener's access to full information
and competing views. 1
83
This listener orientation limits the right to hear in three ways.
First, speech that drowns out competing views receives no protec-
tion because it reduces the listener's access to information. Second,
the right to hear does not protect expression that attempts to per-
suade without serving any informational purpose. Third, because
the protection extends to listeners rather than to the speaker, the
right to hear does not bar regulating the manner of expression so
long as content is unaffected. These qualifications affect the scope
of the right to hear in the first instance; they should not be consid-
ered mere "compelling interests" to be balanced against the first
amendment protection.
As to the first limitation, the Bellotti Court declined to consider,
absent hard evidence, whether the possibility that corporate advo-
cacy might "drown out other points of view" justified prohibiting
expenditures by commercial corporations. 184 The Court treated
this concern as a governmental interest to be balanced against pro-
tected expression. 185 If, however, commercial corporate political
expression does in fact drown out other voices, it does not serve the
interests that the right to hear seeks to protect and therefore merits
no protection in the first place. 186
("Because expression by commercial corporations cannot properly be viewed as either
the self-expression of shareholders or of corporate management, its first amendment
protection should derive solely from the first amendment interests of hearers."). Be-
cause the right to hear applies to political expression regardless of its source, it also
reinforces the guarantees provided by the rights of speech and association. See supra
notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
184 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789; see supra text accompanying notes 101-04.
185 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786-89.
186 See Baldwin & Karpay, supra note 33, at 225-31 (corporate speech receives pro-
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The second limitation on the right to hear-that the right to
hear protects only expression that predominantly informs 17-re-
lates closely to the first. There is a thin line between informing and
persuading. Frequently, full information is itself persuasive. But in
political campaigns, proponents often cross that line when they ad-
vertise not information but images.1 8 8 The Buckley Court, in holding
that Congress could not limit independent expenditures in support
of a candidate, stated that the constitutional right to "' "speak one's
mind . . . on all public institutions"' [protects] '"vigorous advo-
cacy"' no less than '"abstract discussion."' '"189 Nonetheless, the
tection only to the extent that "it contributes to the diversity of views received by the
listening public"); Miller, supra note 92, at 37-38 (corporate political expenditures are
inconsistent with "robust debate in a marketplace of ideas" because "the informing
function [of the first amendment] is based on the assumption that those who speak or
would speak are roughly equal in lung power"); Wright, supra note 4, at 636 ("[T]he
truth-producing capacity of the marketplace of ideas is not enhanced if some are allowed
to monopolize the marketplace by wielding excessive financial resources."). This rea-
soning supports Buckley's rejection of the argument "that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others."
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49; see supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
A plurality of the Court recently reaffirmed Buckley's language in Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903, 911 (1986). The plurality concluded that a
utility company cannot be compelled to provide space in its billing envelopes for state-
ments by a utility consumer group. This case, however, is distinguishable from simple
restraints on corporate expression because the challenged rule represented an extreme
example of a content-based restriction-it only granted access to Pacific Gas's billing
envelopes to an opponent of its positions. Furthermore, the restriction required that
Pacific Gas affirmatively assist its opponents. Interestingly, the Pacific Gas plurality relied
heavily, id. at 908-13, on Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974),
in which the Court struck down a Florida statute granting candidates a right to reply to
deprecatory newspaper editorials. The Tornillo result reflected the Court's conclusion
that the statute would constrain newspaper editorializing and therefore dampen public
debate and limit the variety of views expressed. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257-58. This same
reasoning would support attempts to prevent the domination of public debate by a few
powerful speakers.
187 See Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. L. REv. 372, 383
(1979) ("There may... be an argument for denying first amendment protection to
certain types of commercial speech. Advertisements frequently contain little informa-
tion and instead are intended to create irrational product preferences.").
188 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 50, at 3 ("The electorate is entitled to base its
judgment on a straightforward presentation of a candidate's qualifications for public
office.., rather than on a sophisticated advertising program which is encouraged by the
infusion of vast amounts of money."), reprinted in FEC, supra note 50, at 637; Cox, supra
note 151, at 70 (predicting that, as result of Bellotti and Buckley, "the skill with which the
charismatic candidate is packaged and sold [will) become more and more important, and
ideas and reasons [will] become less and less effective").
189 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
269 (1964) (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) and NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963))); see also id. at 19-21 (contrasting contributions and ex-
penditures as means of conveying basis and intensity of speaker's commitment); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("We cannot sanction the view that the Constitu-
tion, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard
for [its] emotive function .... ").
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right to convey the intensity of one's commitment through unlim-
ited expenditures, although essential to freedom of personal expres-
sion, does not serve the listener's interests.
The third limitation on the right to hear is problematic, but par-
ticularly relevant to the federal statutory scheme. Because the right
to hear only protects listeners' interests, it does not necessarily pro-
tect the speaker's preferred method of speech or, more important,
of financing that speech. 190 Thus, Congress should be able to limit
a commercial corporation's channels of political expression as long
as the process does not impair the expression's effectiveness, a func-
tion of both content and volume.' 9 ' For example, section 44lb(b)'s
provision for the establishment of "a separate segregated fund to be
utilized for political purposes"'192 allows a commercial corporation
to legally support federal candidates. Recipients of corporate polit-
ical communications are unlikely to know or care about financing
technicalities. Therefore, unless the channeling of commercial cor-
porate expression through such funds significantly changes the ex-
pression's message or volume, section 441b(b) does not impair the
right to hear. t 93
The three theoretical limitations on the right to hear, although
difficult to apply in specific cases, 194 suggest that much political ex-
190 Nicholson, supra note 30, at 953-57.
191 Id. The equivalence of expression through alternative channels poses a difficult
empirical question. See infra note 193. Furthermore, the Court has refused to embrace
this type of argument when presented in terms of a time, place, or manner restriction.
See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 n.10 (1980)
("[W]e have consistently rejected the suggestion that a government may justify a con-
tent-based prohibition by showing that speakers have alternative means of expres-
sion."). Professor Nicholson considers Consolidated Edison anomalous in light of "the
numerous cases upholding viewpoint-neutral subject matter restrictions." Nicholson,
supra note 30, at 973. The Consolidated Edison dictum, in any event, is inconsistent with an
approach to the right to hear that looks solely to listeners' interests.
192 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1982); see supra note 124.
193 The FEC made a similar argument in MCFL, and the First Circuit rejected it. 769
F.2d at 22. The court, however, never clearly identified the source of the first amend-
ment protection accorded to MCFL's expenditures. This "alternative means" qualifica-
tion does not apply to the right of association, which derives from the individual's right
of self-expression. Because MCFL's newsletters implicated the right of association, the
First Circuit reached the correct result.
Funneling speech through PACs probably does not change its content because
PACs are typically controlled by top corporate or union management. Nicholson, supra
note 30, at 954. The segregated fund mechanisms may, however, affect the volume of
speech. These funds are subject to reporting, disclosure, and solicitation requirements,
2 U.S.C. §§ 432-434 (1982), that would not apply if corporations had an absolute speech
right. Professor Nicholson has argued that the tremendous growth in the size and
number of PACs since their statutory authorization in 1971 supports the view that con-
straints on PACs have had an insignificant effect on PAC use. She speculated further
that "[i]t seems unlikely that the huge volume of funds generated by PACs today would
be exceeded by direct corporate and.union giving." Nicholson, supra note 30, at 955-56.
194 All three limitations suggest proof problems. Consider, for example, the Bellotti
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pression by commercial corporations merits no first amendment
protection. Yet the right to hear is ubiquitous: it prima facie at-
taches to every expression regardless of the source. This ubiquity
magnifies the potential for overprotection.
The Court apparently requires a showing of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest to sustain any restraint on political expression.195
However, because of the possibility of overprotection, only a more
lenient review of restraints on the right to hear can adequately ac-
count for the interests of listeners in limiting expression that either
does not contribute to or works against their access to full informa-
tion and competing views. 196 Therefore, when the right to hear is
the only first amendment interest at stake, the Court should grant
legislatures greater flexibility in fashioning means of protecting
compelling interests. This kind of deference would permit Con-
gress to address evils not susceptible to precise regulation, includ-
ing campaign expenditures.
197
Moreover, although the Court has long applied strict scrutiny
to restraints on the right of association, 198 cases invoking the right
to hear exhibit considerable tolerance toward prophylactic meas-
ures, particularly in the commercial speech area. For example, in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 199 the Court rejected the argu-
ment that the first amendment interest in the free flow of informa-
tion required "nothing less than actual proved harm" to justify
disciplining an attorney for in-person solicitation of clients. 200 In-
stead, the Court sustained the challenged rule as a permissible pro-
phylactic measure because of the difficulty of enforcing a rule
requiring specific evidence of injury.201 The Court has not yet
adopted this approach for political expression, but neither has it
granted corporations first amendment rights equivalent to those of
Court's rejection of the argument, for lack of evidence, that Massachusetts could restrict
corporate expression in order to protect against the drowning out of other voices. See
supra notes 101-04 & 164 and accompanying text. Moreover, it would be difficult to
prove the informational effectiveness of a particular corporate expression.
195 See supra notes 28 & 98 and accompanying text.
196 See Baldwin & Karpay, supra note 33, at 218-19 (in resolving "conflict between
corporate and natural persons' ... free speech rights," Court should pursue "goal of
maximizing the well-being of natural citizens").
197 The Buckley rule that expenditures constitute speech has frustrated campaign fi-
nance reform. The Buckley Court itself recognized that, where corruption is the evil
feared, it is "difficult to isolate suspect contributions." 424 U.S. at 30; see supra text
accompanying note 76.
198 See supra notes 28 & 156-57 and accompanying text.
199 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
200 Id. at 464.
201 Id. at 466-68. The Supreme Court decided Ohralik on the same day as In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), which rejected prophylactic regulation of legal solicitation
that burdened an ACLU lawyer's right of political association. Id. at 434.
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natural persons.20 2
2. Governmental Interests
The rationales that support section 44lb-shareholder protec-
tion, voter confidence, and corruption prevention-all apply to a
commercial corporation's candidate election expenditures. Of
these, the Court has only recognized the corruption interest as
"compelling." If the Court accepts intermediate scrutiny of legisla-
tive means, however, this interest alone could sustain the statute as
applied to commercial corporations.
Section 441(b)'s first supporting rationale, shareholder protec-
tion, clearly applies to a commercial corporation's political expendi-
tures. Such expenditures involve management use of shareholder
assets to support candidates that shareholders might well oppose. 203
The Bellotti Court, however, substantially weakened this interest.20 4
Furthermore, section 44 lb by its terms applies to small, closely held
corporations where corporate political expenditures actually reflect
the interests of the owners. 20 5 Such overinclusion would be intoler-
able under traditional first amendment overbreadth analysis. 20 6
The Court may choose to revive the shareholder protection inter-
est.2 0 7 Should it choose to do so, the Court could excuse this over-
inclusion if it found that, in light of the right to hear's diminished
protection, the other governmental interests supporting the statute
justified a degree of prophylactic regulation.
The second interest, "citizen participation, ' 208 also poses
problems. Although the Bellotti Court may have been generally re-
ceptive to an argument based on similar grounds, 20 9 it also ap-
202 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 (explicitly reserving question of whether corporations
have full measure of first amendment rights); see also Pacific Gas, 106 S. Ct. at 917 ("I do
not mean to suggest that I would hold, contrary to our precedents, that the corpora-
tion's First Amendment rights are coextensive with those of individuals." (Marshall, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
203 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 105 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 161 and accompanying
text.
205 See O'Kelley, supra note 30, at 1369 (discussion of "corporation sole" in connec-
tion with shareholder interest overbreadth problem).
206 See supra notes 17, 28 & 156 and accompanying text.
207 The NRWC opinion may represent the beginning of such a revival. See supra note
161.
208 See supra notes 57 & 164 and accompanying text.
209 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789 (concern that undue influence of corporate expenditures
might "destroy the confidence of the people in the democratic process and the integrity
of government"); see supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text; cf. Cox, supra note 151,
at 67, 70 ("[I]ncreasing the relative influence of organizations with large financial re-
sources and shrinking the attention paid to truly individual voices means a net loss of
human freedom."). The Bellotti concern resembles the "equalizing" argument flatly re-
jected in Buckley. See Nicholson, supra note 30, at 995-96 (drawing connection between
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peared to require a high but uncertain quantum of empirical
evidence to back the claim.210 Evidence sufficient to convince the
Court that corporate campaign expenditures are undermining our
system of self-government may never exist.
Third, section 441b reflects Congress's concern for the cor-
rupting potential of corporate expenditures.2 1' The Court clearly
accepts the importance of this interest21 2 and has hinted that it
would find the interest sufficient to uphold section 441b.2 1 3 Fur-
thermore, Bellotti does not compel otherwise.2 14 The Court could
sustain the federal statute as a reasonable prophylactic regulation to
prevent actual and apparent political corruption.21 5 However, the
Court would have to limit the prohibition to commercial corpora-
tions or to expenditures protected solely by the right to hear.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should affirm the First Circuit's holding
that section 441b(a) unconstitutionally burdens MCFL's first
amendment rights, basing its decision on the right of association.
Corporate form in no way lessens MCFL's first amendment protec-
tion; nor do any of the governmental interests underlying section
441b support its application to MCFL's expenditures. Sustaining
section 441b as a prophylactic measure would conflict with the de-
gree of precision of regulation required by the right of association.
By deciding this case on the basis of MCFL's ideological pur-
pose, the Court may sustain prohibitions of candidate election ex-
voter confidence theory of Bellotti and equalization theory of Buckley); Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 598-99 (1980) (Bellotti "drowning out" reasoning was
Buckley excessive power argument recast); supra notes 81-82 & 186 and accompanying
text.
210 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789; see supra note 164.
211 See supra notes 55, 167 & 172 and accompanying text.
212 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
213 See NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 500-01; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26; supra text accompa-
nying note 107.
214 See supra notes 99-100, 106-08 and accompanying text.
215 One commentator calls for strict scrutiny of legislative means in campaign fi-
nance cases and sets up the following argument as a straw man:
Genuine corruption, of course, undermines the integrity of any govern-
ment. Moreover, it is difficult to detect and difficult to define precisely in
a statute. Therefore it arguably is impossible to prevent with narrowly
drawn prohibitions. Thus, the argument would go, the Court can reason-
ably permit the legislature to treat the problem with broad prophylactic
rules and need not impose any requirement that the government demon-
strate either the rules' necessity or their efficacy.
BeVier, supra note 151, at 1088 (footnotes omitted). The commentator does not, how-
ever, distinguish between the kind of protection afforded by the various first amendment
rights. She focuses on speakers' rights and seems to question the independent existence
of a right to hear. See id. at 1054 nA9.
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penditures by commercial corporations. A commercial
corporation's political expression implicates only the right to hear,
which provides only limited first amendment protection. Because it
is a qualified right, the Court should defer more readily to restric-
tions on expression protected solely by the right to hear. Further-
more, all of the governmental interests underlying section 441b
apply, in varying degrees, to political expenditures by commercial
corporations. In particular, the Court should defer to Congress's
determination as expressed in section 441b of the need for prophy-
lactic regulation to prevent corruption.
Charles N. Eberhardt
